We revisit the problem of privacy-preserving range search and sort queries on encrypted data in the face of an untrusted data store. Our new protocol RASP has several advantages over existing work. First, RASP strengthens privacy by ensuring forward security: after a query for range [a, b], any new record added to the data store is indistinguishable from random, even if the new record falls within range [a, b]. We are able to accomplish this using only traditional hash and block cipher operations, abstaining from expensive asymmetric cryptography and bilinear pairings. Consequently, RASP is highly practical, even for large database sizes. Additionally, we require only cloud storage and not a computational cloud like related works, which can reduce monetary costs significantly. At the heart of RASP, we develop a new update-oblivious bucket-based data structure. We allow for data to be added to buckets without leaking into which bucket it has been added. As long as a bucket is not explicitly queried, the data store does not learn anything about bucket contents. Furthermore, no information is leaked about data additions following a query. Besides formally proving RASP's privacy, we also present a practical evaluation of RASP on Amazon Dynamo, demonstrating its efficiency and real world applicability.
bility and flexibility allow for significant costs savings. However, cloud infrastructures cannot always be completely trusted, due to, for example, hacker and insider attacks [16, 32] . While encryption of outsourced data protects against many privacy threats in cloud scenarios, it renders subsequent operations on data (i.e., data analysis) extremely difficult. Although fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) offers an elegant solution to perform operations and data analysis on encrypted data, today's techniques are still impractical and their use can negate any cloud cost advantages.
In this paper, we address the problem of performing privacy-preserving range search and sort queries on encrypted outsourced data with a particular focus on practicality. We envision a scenario where a set of users upload a large number of encrypted data records to an untrusted cloud store. From time to time, a surveyor wants to perform data analysis operations. Specifically, the surveyor queries for all the records in a certain range of values ("categories"). Alternatively, the surveyor may query for the top m sorted records, i.e., the m smallest records following some order.
Although the individual data records are encrypted, an untrusted cloud could still infer information about them by observing multiple range and sort operations. For example, the cloud could learn access patterns and correlate them. Consequently, also the analysis operations ("queries") need to be privacy protected. The crucial challenge here is practicality, i.e., high efficiency in terms of bandwidth and memory requirements as well as user/surveyor/cloud computations.
Related Work: Besides FHE, another approach that could apply here is performing range or sort queries on top of an Oblivious RAM [15] . However, with n the total number of outsourced records in the cloud, ORAM worst-case communication complexity is polylogarithmic in n [26, 31] . Thus, for large n (such as n = 2 30 records or more), this overhead becomes unacceptably expensive for sorting and range search. Along the same lines, searchable encryption techniques [8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 20, 27, 30] would either require computational and communication complexities linear in n or non-trivial extensions to perform updates to stored data in a privacy-preserving fashion. Other techniques such D = 1024. Periodically, a surveyor queries the uploaded records for those records whose indices match a certain range in D. The set of records that match this range has size m. Alternatively, the surveyor wants to retrieve the first m records according to their sorted indices.
Possible Applications: One can imagine various real world application scenarios that fall within the general setup above. For example, imagine a set of banks ("users") that upload financial transactions, i.e., the amount of each transaction together with details such as sender, receiver, and date. At times, to detect fraudulent behavior and money laundering, the police queries for all transactions within some suspicious range or the m highest transactions of a certain time period. Alternatively, imagine a set of physicians that upload patient records, comprising the patient's personal information and, say, the patient's blood pressure. Once in a while, for further analysis, a health insurance wants to retrieve details about all patients with blood pressure in a critical range or the top m patients with high blood pressure. In both application scenarios, the stored data is sensi-tive, and the underlying cloud store should not learn details about either stored data or queries performed. This implies encrypting uploaded data by the users and "oblivious queries" by the surveyor. As related work [7, 22, 25, 33] , this paper focuses on "append-only" storage scenarios, i.e., we do not address removal of records. Such data access schemes with data being frequently uploaded and queried rarely allows for especially cheap services. For example, Amazon's "Glacier" offers this model of access and is significantly cheaper than regular S3 or Dynamo storage.
Problem Statement
Trust Model: We only assume that the surveyor is trusted by the users. The cloud server is untrusted and assumed to be fully malicious. The individual users do not communicate or share data with each other, only with the surveyor. In this way, the problem can be seen as a two-party protocol between each user and the surveyor.
Range and Sort Queries
We now formalize privacy-preserving range and m-sort schemes. We start by introducing the functionality that each scheme should support. The main idea is that users respectively encrypt and upload their records to the store, while the surveyor performs range search and sort operations. 
Definition 1 (Range Search and m-Sort Scheme Π). Let I, 0 ≤ I ≤ D − 1, denote a category within domain D and M a plaintext ("payload"). A Range and m-Sort
So, the surveyor executes KeyGen and receives SK and user keys Seed. Each user i is sent distinct user key Seed i that they can use to execute Encrypt for encryption and upload of data. The surveyor can eventually perform range and sort queries. The idea is that the surveyor only prepares the range and sort queries, while the cloud performs the actual querying. In cloud settings, the main computational burden lies in RangeQuery and SortQuery, while PrepareRangeQuery and PrepareSortQuery are lightweight.
Privacy
Overview: We will now present RASP's notion of privacy. Informally, our goal is to leak as little information as possible about the outsourced data records and the queries to the cloud. While the IND-CPA encryption of records already provides a viable first step, the challenge is to restrict leakage of query access patterns. For example, the cloud should not learn any additional information about records that are not part of a query result -besides that these records are obviously not in the queried range or among the top m records. Typically, ORAM based solutions would offer strong protection. However, focusing on efficiency, we dismiss ORAM, because its poly-logarithmic worst-case communication complexity [26, 31] quickly becomes expensive with large n such as n = 2 30 . Additionally, as ORAM does not allow multiple distrustful users (even as few as two), a straightforward extension to range search and sort is vulnerable to collusions. RASP targets privacy that is slightly weaker than ORAM's privacy, but still stronger than privacy provided by related work on range search. We call this privacy forward-secure. Intuitively, the cloud (now called adversary A) should not learn any details about a new record R that is added to the store, i.e., A should not learn anything about R's category I (and payload M ). Only when the surveyor executes a range search or sort query will A learn whether R matches this query or not. Our goal is that any two records R, R that do not match a query will remain computationally indistinguishable for A. We formalize our privacy goal. Targeting a standard simulation-based privacy definition, the idea is that, given a well specified privacy-leakage, a polynomial-time simulator can generate a transcript of RASP which is computationally indistinguishable from the output of the actual protocol. If this is true, then A cannot learn any information beyond the defined leakage.
In summary, forward-secure privacy allows A to only learn: (1) the operation pattern, i.e., which operation (range or sort) is performed, (2) the data access pattern, i.e., which records are accessed during an operation, and (3) the enumeration pattern, i.e., which records are returned. As we will discuss later in Section 3.3 this forward-secure privacy is actually stronger than the privacy offered by related work on range search [7, 22, 25, 33] .
We focus on key-value "(k, v)" based cloud stores/databases such as Amazon Dynamo DB or S3 in this paper, so we assume that each record is uniquely addressable by an address k in the store. We refer to the keys in the key-value paradigm as addresses to avoid the confusion with cryptographic keys.
Formal Definitions
Following Curtmola et al. [13] , we formalize privacy by quantifying the information leakage of a scheme Π. 
Definition 2 (Operation
This means that the sort leaks the t categories which contain the first m records, including their order, as well as m itself. 
Definition 7 (Trace
Real Π A (s) K = (SK, {Seed i } 1≤i≤|U | ) ← KeyGen(1 s ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q (st A , o i ) ← A(st A , (K 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (K i−1 , C i−1 ), 1 s ) (K i , C i ) ← Execute(o i , K) let K * = (K 1 , . . . , K q ) let C * = (C 1 , . . . , C q ) output v = (K * , C * ) and st A Sim Π A,S (s) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q (st A , o i ) ← A(st A , (K 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (K i−1 , C i−1 ), 1 s ) (K i , C i , st S ) ← S(st S , τ (o 1 , . . . , o i ), 1 s ) let K * = (K 1 , . . . , K q ) let C * = (C 1 , . . . , C q ) output v = (K * ,|P r[D(v, st A ) = 1 : (v, st A ) ← Real Π A (s)]− P r[D(v, st A ) = 1 : (v, st A ) ← Sim Π A,S (s)]| ≤ negl(s).
Discussion
Our definition captures an adaptive adversary which generates the history one operation at a time, seeing the results of the previous operations. This allows for an adversary which changes his strategy depending on what the simulator has output after i < q operations. Consequently, the simulator calculates one step of the simulation at a time based on a partial trace generated from an adaptive history.
Definition 7 is generic in that it allows us to bound the information leaked by any protocol which uses a cloud store. If there exists a simulator, given only the trace, which can produce a sequence of "accesses" that is indistinguishable from a real execution of the protocol, then no information other than the trace can be leaked.
Note that schemes secure under the above definitions leak only the trace τ (H). Trivially, leaking patterns allows the adversary to derive additional information, e.g., the complement of a query. This leakage is problem inherent to all related work [7, 22, 25, 33] . We refer to Islam et al. [19] for a detailed discussion on implications of range search queries. Again, we stress that our goal is practicality, and additionally protecting patterns would require expensive ORAM-like mechanisms. From a privacy perspective, we place our definition between weaker related work [7, 22, 25, 33] and stronger ORAM [15] . Yet, as we will see later, RASP offers better efficiency than both.
We consider fully malicious adversaries that only target privacy, but not integrity. While important, attacks against the integrity of range search or sort results are out of scope of this work. One can envision extensions to RASP verifying returned data, e.g., using previously computed signatures, but these deserve their own research.
Forward-Secure privacy vs. privacy of related work
We stress that forward-secure privacy, Definition 7, is stronger than privacy models of previous work on range search [7, 22, 25, 33] . These schemes offer only selective security. That is, a query for a specific range [a, b] implies that A from then on will be able to automatically determine whether new records added in future will also be within [a, b] or not -a major disadvantage. In contrast, our privacy definition guarantees that even a record R ∈ [a, b] added after the range query for [a, b] is indistinguishable from random until [a, b] is queried again. Moreover, the work by Shi et al. [25] is Match Revealing (selective-MR). This means that, if a record matches, its category is leaked to A, too. In contrast, the work by Boneh and Waters [7] and Lu [22] is Match Concealing (selective-MC). Definition 7 never leaks the category to A, and therefore is Match Concealing. Additionally, Lu [22] requires that the adversary must not know the distribution of records' categories. As the ciphertexts are stored in a B-tree, visible to the store, knowledge of the category distribution is enough to reveal all ciphertexts, cf. Lu [22] , §9. This is a rather significant drawback, as there are many useful situations where the adversary may either partially or fully know the plaintext distribution.
Besides the query width, Definition 7 offers improved privacy over Order Preserving Encryption (IND-OPE). In IND-OPE, A immediately learns the order of records. After a range query, A can determine for any record added in the future whether it is in the (encrypted) range or not. Also, A learns for any record whether it is smaller or larger than a range's (encrypted) endpoint. In contrast, Definition 7 only leaks membership to an encrypted range of encrypted records for those records queried at the time of the query, but not for updates (therefore called "update-oblivious").
Targeting practicality, Definition 7 is weaker than the one of ORAM. In contrast to ORAM, Definition 7 does not protect access patterns. That is, A can observe that subsequent queries access the same records. However, as noted before, in addition to its inefficiency ORAM is vulnerable to collusion attacks as it does not support multiple users. Later in our performance comparison, we show that ORAM is drastically less efficient than our scheme. Additionally, ORAM does not solve the problem that we pose in this paper, because it does not allow for multiple clients.
Update-Oblivious Linked Lists
For its range and sort queries, RASP relies on a new kind of data type that we call update-oblivious addenumerate data type. Its purpose is to allow a Writer to add values to buckets (the categories). Also, a Reader can enumerate all values of a bucket. The sole privacy goal is to hide from an adversary storing all data which bucket a new value is added to by the Writer at the least until this specific bucket is enumerated by the Reader. We will now start by describing the operations and privacy properties that update-oblivious addenumerate data types support. Then, we will introduce an original data type LL, a sequence of linked lists that supports update-oblivious operations, and we will prove its privacy properties.
An add-enumerate data type comprises a sequence of D buckets, dynamic data structures indexed by I, 1 ≤ I ≤ D. This data type supports adding values to the individual buckets and enumerating individual buckets, i.e., enumerating all values that have been previously added to one of the buckets. Again, we assume a key-value based underlying cloud store. Each "value" v added is uniquely addressable by an address k in the store. More formally, an add-enumerate data type supports two algorithms: -Add(I, v) : On input bucket I, 1 ≤ I ≤ D, and value v ∈ {0, 1} * , this algorithm adds v to I and outputs address k ∈ {0, 1} * . We call the pair (k, v) valid.
-Enumerate(I) : This algorithm returns the set
Update-Oblivious Privacy
Again, we use a simulation-based privacy definition for update-oblivious data types. Similarly to Definition 7, A can learn (1) the operation pattern (which operation is performed on the data type), (2) the data access pattern (which data in the individual data structures is accessed during an operation), and (3) the enumeration pattern (which values are returned as part of an Enumerate). However, the enumeration pattern will not reveal the indices of values enumerated never before. Being clear from the context, we reuse the notions of histories and operations defined previously in the context of add-enumerate data types, with a new definition of Trace to quantify information leakage. 
Definition 9 (Operation). An operation op is either (Add, I, v) or (Enumerate, I, ⊥).

Definition 10 (Enumeration Pattern
If Type(o i ) = Add, then the i th row of this matrix contains ones in the columns corresponding to an enumerate that happens after this add. Therewith, the enumeration pattern reveals which category an add corresponds to only after an enumerate occurs for that same category. If the result of an add is never queried, i.e., no enumerate occurs after for that category, then the entire row in the matrix will contain only zeroes, and the category of the add is not leaked. An access pattern γ will reveal when two enumerates are on the same category. We stress that this is also revealed as part of the enumeration pattern, and so is not additional leakage, but we include this separate notation for clarity and ease of exposition in our proof.
Definition 12 (Adaptive update-oblivious). Let the trace induced by a q-query history H be tuple τ (H) = (σ(H), β(H), γ(H)).
We define adaptive update-oblivious ("updateoblivious") privacy using the same generic simulationbased experiments as above (Definition 7), but include the new Definition 12 of trace for this data structure.
The Data Type LL
We present a new add-enumerate data type LL which implements the sequence of D buckets as linked lists on top of any key-value based store.
Overview:
The main rationale of LL is that Reader and Writer synchronize their access to the same bucket/linked list I using an array of flags. If the Writer wants to update linked list I by adding a new value v, he verifies whether the Reader has enumerated I after the last add by checking the flag for this list. If the Reader has enumerated I, then the Writer does not simply append v to I, but creates a new chain for I, adds v to this chain, and updates the flag. The Writer will continue adding values to this new chain, until the Reader enumerates I again. Then, the Writer will create another new chain etc. On the other hand, the Reader checks a flag to understand whether the Writer has created a new chain for I, thereby knowing how many chains of I contain values. The security rationale for starting a new chain for I after an enumeration of I is that A cannot determine category I for a newly added value by linking to a previous enumerate of I.
Details:
Reader and Writer share a secret key κ that, for simplicity, has been exchanged in advance. LL comprises a total of D linked lists which are indexed by I, 1 ≤ I ≤ D. In the underlying key-value store, the head of linked list I, the start of the first chain of I, can be accessed using address h κ (I, 1), where h is a pseudorandom function, and "," is an unambiguous pairing of inputs.
Writer and reader synchronize using an encrypted array of flags ∆ = (δ 1 , . . . , δ D ), δ i ∈ {0, 1}. They can save and retrieve Enc κ (∆), where Enc denotes encryption, in the underlying key-value store using address h κ ("delta"). Initially, all flags δ i are set to 0.
For each linked list I, the Writer stores a local counter γ . Note that the Reader retrieves all values of a chain by using Algorithm 3. There, D is the decryption algorithm for encryptions Enc. Using ∆ for synchronization between Writer and Reader, the Writer will avoid putting a new value into the underlying store using an address that the Reader has previously already queried for as part of an enumerate. In this case, the Writer will start a new chain and notify the Reader that a new chain is available. 
Privacy Analysis
For our proof, we use the notion of IND$-CPA encryption from Rogaway [24] . Informally, this definition means that an encryption scheme (Enc, Dec) is indistinguishable from an oracle which produces random strings of the same length as a ciphertext. This can be implemented, e.g., by a PRP (like AES) in CBC-or Countermode.
Theorem 1. If h is a pseudo-random function, and Enc is an IND$-CPA encryption, then LL is updateoblivious.
Due to space constraints, the proof has been moved to Appendix A.
Resiliency to Collusion Attacks:
Since every user has their own key, independent of the other users, it is simple to see that users cannot collude with each other or with the cloud server to learn anything beyond their own data.
Extensions to Mitigate Consistency Attacks:
Contrary to previous work on range search [7, 22, 25, 33] , we allow different entities to access data: the Reader and the Writer. As the two entities synchronize using ∆, a fully malicious adversary could mount attacks by desynchronization, such as sending outdated versions of ∆. So far, our definitions of update-oblivious and of data type LL above have implicitly required read-afterwrite consistency. Yet, although the Reader has read bucket I and set δ I := 1, A could send an old version of Enc(∆) with δ I = 0 to the Writer during Add. Consequently, the Writer would not create a new chain, but add a new record at an address already read by the Reader -violating update-obliviousness.
Thus, we now show how we can easily extend our system to cope even with adversaries A mounting consistency attacks. Inspired by Li et al. [21] , we augment ∆ by two additional global counters, one for the Reader, one for the Writer. Both counters will be encrypted as part of ∆. For each Enumerate, the Reader increases its counter. For each Add, the Writer increases its counter. Both parties keep local copies of counters, compare to ∆'s counters upon receipt, and therewith verify the freshness of ∆. Even in the face of fully malicious A mounting consistency attacks on the (augmented) ∆, this approach achieves Fork Consistency, the strongest consistency possible in the absence of a third trusted party [21] . In short, after such an attack, Surveyor and User will be in different "worlds": no change performed to the data will ever be seen by the Surveyor. The surveyor remains at the state of the old, not-updated data set, however with full privacy guarantees. For more details on this technique, we refer to Li et al. [21] . Note that in scenarios similar to related work with only one entity to read and write to the store, LL would not synchronize ∆, making consistency attacks impossible.
Generalization:
The update-oblivious property can be extended to other data types. Let a monotonicallyexpanding data type S be any data type supporting two general operations Add(S, E) and Enumerate(S, param) such that i < j ⇒ Enumerate(S i , param) ⊆ Enumerate(S j , param). We postulate that any monotonic data type can be made update-oblivious. Hash Tables, Trees, Graphs are examples of data types that can be restricted to be monotonically-expanding, if deletions are not allowed. Such expanding types make sense in applications where data is continuously added to an application data store. For example, an update-oblivious Hash Table that stores key-value pairs can be constructed using our bucket data type LL. The user hashes the key into a bucket id I, then invokes LL-Add(I, v, κ). Graphs (and trees) can be viewed as a collection of edges. The Add adds edges to the collection, while Enumerate lists edges (or properties of edges). Our bucket data type LL can be used to implement the same update-obliviousness for expanding graphs, trees, and other dynamic data types.
RASP
Overview:
The main rationale behind RASP is to arrange uploaded data with category I using an updateoblivious add-enumerate data type such as LL that offers buckets. In RASP, each individual bucket represents a category I within domain D of uploaded data M . With n D, we achieve low query complexity similar to bucket sort. Uploading new data into a bucket is realized by using Add in LL. Similarly, range search queries and actual bucket sorts can be realized using Enumerate. Our goal with this approach is to reduce the complexity for range search and sort queries over related work. RASP's query complexity depends only on D and U which we assume to be small, but the complexity is independent of n as in related work. To support multiple users U, we use an LL data type per user. Users share pairwise different keys with the surveyor.
RASP Details
We now present RASP's details, following the notation introduced in Section 3.1. The system is initialized with KeyGen, producing key material for users and the surveyor. Each time, a user U i wants to upload data to the cloud, he first uses Encrypt and uploads the resulting ciphertext into the cloud's keyvalue store. For a range query, the surveyor executes algorithms PrepareRangeQuery and RangeQuery intertwined. Similarly, for a sort query, he executes algorithms PrepareSortQuery and SortQuery intertwined. In the algorithms below, Enc and Dec are IND$-CPA encryption and decryption (see Section 4.3) such as AES-CBC with random IVs, and h is a pseudo-random function such as HMAC [4] using proper input padding.
KeyGen(k)
As shown in Algorithm 4, the system is initialized by generating a secret key SK for the surveyor as well as individual user keys Seed i . A key Seed i is then sent to user U i , and the surveyor receives SK. Note that knowledge of SK is sufficient for the surveyor to compute users keys Seed i himself.
Encrypt(I, M, Seed i ) Algorithm 5 is executed by user U i that wants to add data M to bucket I in the key-value store. U i simply runs LL-Add to add data M to category/bucket I in LL. Note that LL-Add uploads encrypted data to the key-value store. parameter specifies that algorithm LL-Enumerate will stop retrieving ciphertexts after finding m ciphertexts (if available) while iterating over the chains of category i, regardless whether there might be more ciphertexts in the chains. Following the definition of m-sort in Section 3.1, the search token T S in RASP is the sequence of addresses for the key-value store. Note During range search and sort queries, when the surveyor performs multiple Enumerate sequentially for the same user, it is not necessary to download and upload ∆ multiple times, but only once. The same ∆ can be used for all categories/buckets of a single user, so this saves a factor of D in computation and communication complexity without affecting privacy. We apply this optimization in our evaluation in Section 5.3.
Privacy Analysis
Theorem 2. If LL is update-oblivious, then RASP is forward-secure privacy-preserving.
Due to space constraints, the proof has been moved to Appendix B.
Multi-user privacy: As mentioned in Section 3, one goal is to obtain security against malicious user collusion, so colluding users cannot obtain any information beyond the sum of what they could obtain individually. This is relatively straightforward in RASP, because users do not share any information or relationship beyond their common trust of the surveyor. Each user writes all of their data to locations generated pseudorandomly with a seed known only to them and to the surveyor. Therefore, if the address space is large enough, there will be a negligible probability that malicious users can guess any of the addresses used by other users, effectively segmenting each user into their own pseudorandom subset of the address space that is unknown to other users. If a collision-resistant hash function is used to generate these locations, then no user will be able to guess addresses of other users' data, and that users' writes will collide with each other with low probability. In our implementation we use SHA-256 which, informally, is assumed to provide 128 Bit collision resistance. Note that modern cloud key-value databases, e.g., DynamoDB or S3, allow arbitrary key sizes.
Evaluation
We have implemented RASP in Java, and the source code is available for download [1] . As RASP does not require any computation on the store, our implementation uses the standard Amazon Dynamo DB cloud as the underlying key-value store. Dynamo DB charges based on the required Get/Put operations per second which is essentially an estimation of the load expected on the database. For our tests, we configured a database supporting 3000 Get and 1000 Puts per second and read-after-write consistency. Such a database would cost ≈ $680 per month [3] . As encryption Enc, we use 128 Bit AES in CBC-mode and HMAC with SHA-256 as hash function h. As we are only interested in the additional overhead of RASP compared to a non-privacy preserving protocol, we did not encrypt and upload a real payload d (e.g., patient data) as part of records, but only a random string of length 160 Bit. In the real world, this could be an address for a larger file in the cloud. For the user and surveyor part of RASP, we have used a laptop with 2.4 GHz i7 CPU and 8 GByte RAM.
As RASP's query performance does not depend on n, we have measured timings for Encrypt (Algorithm 5, including upload), Range Queries, and Sort Queries on a Dynamo data store with a fixed number of n = 2 25 records. We have set the number of users |U | to 100 and varied D = {64, 256, 1024}, and m from .01% to .4% of n for range queries. For m-sort, we varied m from 32 to 512. Data is distributed into buckets according to a Gaussian distribution to better represent a real world scenario. In practice, the most interesting pieces of data are usually in the tail of the distribution, and most data is distributed normally. However, this choice does not significantly effect the running time of our scheme as it depends only on m and D. We also ran further tests increasing D to see the impact it has on performance. For these benchmarks, we fixed m at .3% of the total data. The uneven values of m for range search are the result of querying ranges separated by one bucket when D = 64 (the smallest unit of change that would be evenly divisible for all values of D). Since the data is Gaussian, increasing the range by one bucket increases m by an uneven amount. To model interleaving client and surveyor operations (and force creating new chains), we distributed queries exponentially with n 100 average arrival rate. However, we measured timings only after adding all n records, representing worst case queries. We have run each sample point 20 times, and relative standard deviation was low at <5%. Figure 1 sums up our evaluation and presents timings in ms per record. All timings are dominated by network latency. In Dynamo, a single Get takes 31 ms, and a Put takes 39 ms. In contrast, (Java Bouncy Castle) AES encryption (≈ 14 µs) and HMAC evaluation (≈ 6 µs) are comparably fast on our setup. In comparison, a typical Type-A 512 bit pairing [10] required by related work [7, 22, 25, 33 ] is 3 orders of magnitude more expensive and takes ≈ 8 ms, an exponentiation takes ≈ 11 ms. We stress that, in contrast to other work [22] , our evaluation does not rely on (expensive) cryptographic hardware acceleration running on the user, surveyor, or cloud store. We established a baseline (≈ 0.21 ms) by testing the amount of time it takes to retrieve a record from Dynamo without any encryption or secure data structure. This was done using Dynamo's built-in range search capability and represents a lower bound for any range search algorithm. A single Encrypt of a single user in RASP takes ≈ 64 ms in our configurations. Times for single Get, Put, and Encrypt are significantly higher compared to Range and Sort queries for the surveyor per record, although the same operations (encryption, hash, network access) are required. This is due to the fact that during, e.g., a range query, RASP allows the surveyor to enumerate multiple LL-buckets in parallel with Dynamo. Dynamo allows to issue multiple Get-requests from multiple threads in parallel, reducing the total response time significantly. We estimate the single record upload time in related work, e.g., Lu [22] to ≈ 589 ms for D = 256 (2 + 6 · log D exponentiations + 1 Put) which is notably higher than RASP.
Timings for range queries, Fig. 1a , and sort queries, Fig. 1b , increase slightly with D, as ∆ becomes larger and needs to be downloaded/uploaded and decrypted/encrypted by the surveyor. Similarly, with increasing |U|, more ∆ need to be downloaded and processed. Sort is more expensive than range search, because access to buckets cannot be parallelized: to find the first m records, buckets need to be accessed sequentially. However, sort has an additional security property that is not present with range search. If the end of a sort query lands in a bucket which contains entries for more than one user, not all of the users' data will be revealed (only enough to satisfy the sort query). In exchange for this additional privacy, sort queries are significantly more expensive. If this additional privacy is not needed, one can accomplish the same thing by issuing sequential range queries for each bucket until enough results are returned to satisfy the m-sort. This will achieve similar performance per record to the much faster range sort.
To put RASP's range search into perspective, we determined the performance for Lu [22] by using JPBC [10] to find a cost for one pairing on our hardware and then multiplying by the number of pairings needed per query in their scheme. We then divided by the number of records returned to get an amortized query computation cost per record and finally added the baseline communication cost as outlined above. Note that our comparison is for RASP with 100 users and related work with just a single user. When related work is modified for multiple users, the straightforward way which allows for the same cross-user privacy guarantees as RASP (making a separate index for each user) imposes over a 20 times slowdown. We compare against our scheme with 100 users to show that we can scale to a multi-user setting with minimal performance degradation.
We also compare our scheme to an ORAM based solution. Specifically, we calculate the overhead imposed using Path ORAM [31] . Since implementing such a scheme is outside the scope of this paper, our numbers assume maximum efficiency for the ORAM-based search and include only the access time required to retrieve the individual results. This is calculated by multiplying the baseline access time to retrieve a block in DynamoDB by the multiplicative block overhead that Path ORAM incurs given n = 2 25 . The multiplicative overhead for Path ORAM in this case will be 4 log 2 n, or 2500 for our setting of n = 2 25 . However, we again stress that ORAM does not solve the problem we pose in this paper: it does not allow for multiple clients. Yet, and under the most favorable conditions, it is much less efficient than our solution RASP. In fact, our setting is particularly bad for ORAM because the block size we require is very small. Performance for Path ORAM normally varies from O(log n) for large blocks to O(log 2 n)
for blocks that are O(log n). In our scenario the payload is a pointer which is exactly of size log n, the worst possible size for Path ORAM in terms of performance.
In comparison with Lu [22] , range search with RASP is several times faster when D or m are small, but also comes very close to the optimal baseline when m is larger, see Fig. 1a . Additionally, RASP is faster at adding records by an order of magnitude. As the costs for exponentiation and pairing based related work is non-negligible even on our powerful hardware, we conclude that its use in scenarios with embedded devices, smartphones, and large n is limited. On the server side, RASP does not require any computation to be performed at the store and so can be run on a cloud storage service without any costly computational resources. 6 Related Work and Summary
Other Approaches
ORAM Privacy-preserving range search and sort queries could be realized based on, for example, ORAM [15] protocols. The idea would be to simply encrypt all records, store them in an ORAM (e.g., in sorted order), and let the surveyor perform the range search on the ORAM. This results in strong privacy, because plaintexts can be encrypted using an IND-CPA cipher, and ORAM does not leak any information about accesses and therewith queries. The drawback of ORAM is that its worst-case communication complexity remains high for this application, despite recent results that reduce it to poly(log n) [26, 31] . We do not include "ObliviStore" [28] in our comparison, because, fundamentally, it is only an implementation of the √ n complexity ORAM by Stefanov et al. [29] . While also targeting practicality, it requires either trusted hardware on the data store or a private cloud for the user and is therefore difficult to compare to our setup. Currently, Wang et al. [34] are using ORAM to develop general oblivious data structures. While they are able to reduce complexity for, e.g., a search tree down to O(log n) with O(log n) client memory, this is still more than RASP, cf. Table 1 . Similarly, Stefanov et al. [30] use Oblivious RAM techniques to support forward-secure keyword search, but it also maintains complexity which is polylogarithmic in the size of the database.
OPE Alternatively, using OPE [6, 23] , ciphertexts retain the order of their underlying plaintexts, making range search and sorting straightforward. However, OPE gives weak privacy, as the relationship between ciphertexts is immediately visible to the cloud.
Searchable Encryption
Recently, searchable encryption has received a lot of attention, e.g., [8, 11, 13, 14, 20, 27, 30] and derivatives; see Bösch et al. [9] for an overview. Searchable encryption can be extended in a straightforward way to perform range search. For example, each data record could be encrypted with the category it belongs to. Such constructions would have the (prohibitive) drawback of being linear in n. Any more efficient approach, e.g., enumerating over categories as RASP, would need to solve the (non-trivial) problem of being forward-secure. One might apply RASP to allow for such privacy, resulting in a protocol comparable to RASP. Similarly, it is non-trivial to extend searchable encryption schemes to allow for sort in a privacy-preserving, yet practical way and, consequently, deserves its own research.
In this context, we stress that the approach by Goh [14] using a PRF is fundamentally different from the one by RASP: Goh [14] uses a PRF to enumerate keywords in per-file Bloom filters for keyword search. In contrast, we use PRFs to generate pointers to the start of linked lists achieving update-obliviousness.
Range Search
Some related work focuses especially on privacy-preserving range search. For example, Hacigümüs et al. [17] and Hore et al. [18] encrypt records and put ciphertexts in a set of permuted categories. While this hides into which category a record is added, the cloud automatically learns the relationship between ciphertexts and can determine which ciphertexts are in the same category. Other works [7, 22, 25, 33] overcome this drawback and hide membership to a category until this particular category is queried -still, the cloud will be able to determine for any ciphertext added after the query whether it is belonging to the previously queried category or not. While [7, 22, 33] are selective match concealing (selective-MC), [25] is selective match revealing (selective-MR), i.e., the cloud will learn the category of a record that matches a range query. Moreover, these schemes make use of computationally expensive bilinear pairings. Similarly, recent work by Wand et al. [33] uses asymmetric cryptography to overcome a certain privacy leakage in multi-dimensional range search. However, based on R-trees, its range search worst-case complexity is in O(n).
Generally, the notion of forward security for range search differs from forward-security for symmetric encryption techniques by Bellare and Yee [5] , i.e., perfect forward secrecy. Our notion of forward security is similar to the one by Stefanov et al. [30] for searchable encryption mechanisms.
Comparison
As RASP offers not only range search, but also sort capabilities together with stronger (forward-secure) privacy than related range search schemes or OPE, it is difficult to compare its performance. Still, to put things into perspective, we sum up RASP's asymptotic performance and contrast it to related work in tables 1 and 2.
We stress that related work has not been designed for use in multi-user scenarios. While related work could be extended to multiple users, e.g., using different keys for each user in OPE or separate ORAMs for each user, this increases complexities significantly or would require a significant redesign. A straightforward extension adds a factor of |U| in tables 1 and 2, which renders such approaches overly costly. Tables 1 and 2 show the computational complexities to add a new record to the store for the user (for both range search and sort), for the surveyor to perform the query, and for the cloud during a query. The computational complexities comprise record encryption and decryption (for m records) operations. The communication complexities denote the communication between surveyor and cloud during a range or sort query. Security factor s in the communication complexities indicates that symmetric key ciphertexts are exchanged, and s indicates asymmetric key ciphertexts. In each table, we compare to an ideal solution, representing a lower bound for each complexity.
Computation and Communication
ORAM provides a regular RAM interface, so any operation can be done by simply using the same "ideal" algorithm that would be used on unencrypted data. The overall cost of this operation will then be the same as the ideal, but with a poly-logarithmic overhead specific to the ORAM implementation. For example, In the case of an Insert, an ideal solution would be using an interval tree [12] . OPE and an Ideal solution all require (a factor of) log D communication complexity, because the m records in the D categories/buckets need to be addressed.
Note: It is important to point out that, while related work on range search [7, 22, 25] or OPE [23] has better asymptotic complexities than RASP (log D vs. D), RASP is linear in D only due to synchronization array ∆. In practice, bit array ∆ is very small, especially compared to a single patient record. For example, with D = 8192 categories, |∆| = 1 KByte resulting in only 64 AES operations. In all practical scenarios as targeted in this paper (n D) the linear number of AES operations will outperform log D exponentiations and pairing operations.
Refering to our evaluation in Section 5.3, we indicate that RASP's constants are very low, using only symmetric cryptography, i.e., hash functions and block ciphers. Also, RASP does not require any expensive O(n) computation on the cloud side that the surveyor would have to pay for [2] , but only a cheap key-value based storage cloud such as Amazon Dynamo [3] .
For m-sort, a scheme based on OPE [23] would just parse the OPE tree and send the m records. Again, ORAM-based sorting mechanisms with O(m) accesses to the ORAM (assuming records are already sorted, e.g., in an interval tree) become quickly too expensive. In contrast to related work, RASP is close to an Ideal solution, besides the additional factor of |U | · D which is small in practice, cf. Section 5.3. Note that recent range search schemes [7, 22, 25, 33] do not support msort queries in a straightforward way, so we cannot include them in Table 2 . While extending range search schemes to support sorting in an efficient, yet secure (e.g., forward-secure) way might be possible, it is far from straightforward.
Privacy
RASP's forward-secure privacy notion is stronger than related work's selective match concealing or selective match revealing [25] or IND-OCPA as discussed in Section 3.3. In contrast to OPE, new records remain indistinguishable from random until the surveyor explicitly queries for them. Moreover, all records returned as part of the same query remain indistinguishable among each other. With OPE, any record uploaded to the cloud can immediately be related to other records. While stronger than OPE, RASP offers weaker privacy than ideal IND-CPA and indistinguishable query patterns.
Storage
Finally, we briefly summarize storage requirements. Being tree based, OPE by Popa et al. [23] requires an additional O(log n) storage overhead per ciphertext. Similarly, recent ORAMs are tree based and, with n nodes in the tree, require an overhead factor of either O(log n) [26] or O(s ) [31] per ciphertext. Here, s is an additional security parameter. While the work by Stefanov et al. [31] has superior computational worst-case complexity than Shi et al. [26] 
Conclusion
RASP addresses privacy-preserving range search and sort on outsourced, encrypted data. RASP offers stronger privacy than related work as well as support for multiple, non-trusted users. RASP builds on top of LL, a new dynamic data structure (of independent interest) for privacy-preserving add/enumerate operations. Both, Abstaining from pairings and exponentiations, our protocols target practicality. Our performance evaluations show that, even without hardware acceleration support, RASP offers substantially better performance than recent log D range search techniques for realistic settings, in addition to requiring only storage capabilities and not cloud computation (a significant cost savings).
